Ninth Circuit Establishes Pro-Employee Test for Releasing ERISA Rights

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently decided the question of whether and how employees can be induced to give up their right to sue under ERISA.

In Schuman v. Microchip Technology, Inc., the Ninth Circuit (the court that hears appeals from federal trial courts in Washington and the west coast) reversed the trial court’s dismissal of ERISA claims by two employees who participated in the defendant’s ERISA plan.

The ERISA plan was unusual. Most employees who participate in ERISA plans receive what we think of as the “normal” benefits of employment: health insurance, disability or life insurance, etc.

The Plan in Schuman was created especially for the purpose of providing severance benefits to employees who might be laid off following an anticipated merger. One employer was about to merge with another, and wanted to offer the understandably anxious employees some reassurance about their job security. If an employee was deemed redundant after the merger, they would receive severance benefits from the ERISA plan.

Or so the employees thought. Unsurprisingly, this became a point of contention when the merger was consummated and layoffs ensued without the promised severance.

Schuman was fired without cause by the new employer shortly after the merger. Like most layoffs, Schuman’s involved an offer of some cash (much less than the ERISA plan had promised) in exchange for signing a standard severance agreement releasing all of Schuman’s claims against the company.

Critically, the employer told Schuman and others that the benefits promised under the ERISA plan were no longer available, claiming the plan had “expired.” Confronted with this all-or-nothing proposition, Schuman signed the release.

Schuman and other employees later filed a class action lawsuit. They alleged that the employers violated ERISA by, basically, lying to them about the availability of severance benefits under the ERISA plan to induce them to sign a release that gave up those benefits in favor of substantially smaller severance payments. The lawsuit sought benefits under the ERISA plan for severance. It also sought to void the releases signed by Schuman and other workers.

The trial court held the releases were valid. It dismissed the lawsuit.

The Ninth Circuit reversed. First, the appellate court established the test for whether an ERISA plan participant’s release of claims is valid.

Such a release, the court said, is valid only if it survives “special scrutiny.” That is because Congress enacted ERISA for the special purpose of protecting employees’ benefits. Employers are “fiduciaries” under ERISA. They have to put the interests of their plan participants first.

The appellate court therefore stated that the test for whether a release of claims under an ERISA plan is valid depends on the “totality of the circumstances” including, importantly, whether the company that procured the release is accused of improper conduct. The court listed the circumstances that should be considered as part of this decision, including the employee’s sophistication and knowledge of their rights, how the payment for the release compares to the value of the benefits the employee is giving up by signing, and whether the employer improperly induced the employee to sign.

Having formulated this test, the Ninth Circuit sent the case back to the lower court to apply it.

This recognizes the reality that allowing employers to seduce their workers into signing away their rights under the employer’s ERISA plan is like letting the fox guard the henhouse. The Ninth Circuit’s test helps ensure that employers cannot deceive their workers into releasing claims under the statute designed to protect them from just this sort of manipulation.

Ninth Circuit Helps Clarify Meaning of “Earnings” In Disability Insurance

Calculating earnings can be really important to disability insurance. Most disability insurance policies define “disability” in relation to how much the insured earned before they became disabled. For instance, a policy might say “we will pay you the insurance benefits if an injury keeps you from being able to earn 60% of what you earned while healthy.” And a person’s earnings often determine the amount of insurance benefits. Many disability policies will pay a person who becomes disabled a certain percentage of what they earned while working.

Calculating these amounts is simple where a person earns a basic salary. But where the insured earned things like bonuses, stock options, or fringe benefits, it can get complicated.

A recent Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision provides some guidance on this. In Neumiller v. Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company, the Ninth Circuit addressed a dispute over how to calculate earnings in a case where the way earnings were calculated made the difference between the insured receiving ongoing disability benefits versus those benefits being terminated.

Neumiller had a disability insurance policy with Hartford. The policy paid benefits if she became disabled. The benefits ended if she earned more than 60% of what she made before becoming disabled.

Hartford decided Neumiller had earned more than that and terminated her benefits. Neumiller disagreed and filed a lawsuit under ERISA. The lower court agreed with Hartford. Neumiller appealed.

The Ninth Circuit focused on the insurance policy’s definition of “Current Monthly Earnings” to determine whether Neumiller had earned more than the 60% pre-disability earnings threshold that allowed Hartford to terminate her insurance benefits. The policy defined Current Monthly Earnings to mean money Neumiller received from any employment while disabled.

Neumiller argued that pre-tax deductions from her paycheck and certain bonuses fell outside this definition. The Ninth Circuit mostly disagreed.

The court looked to the dictionary definition of “earnings”, which meant any revenue gained from labor or services. It decided this definition was simple enough that it didn’t need to further consider what the term “earnings” might mean. Under this definition, the fact that bonuses weren’t explicitly listed in the insurance policy did not mean bonuses weren’t “earnings.”

And Neumiller’s pre-tax deductions were “earnings” too. Even though the deductions didn’t wind up in her paycheck, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that these funds went into her 401(k) because of her voluntary election. They were therefore “earned.”

But the Ninth Circuit did agree with Neumiller that bonuses paid out every four months were not “monthly” earnings under the insurance policy’s use of the term “Current Monthly Earnings.” These bonuses were paid for work performed over a four-month period. The lower court had nevertheless treated the entire amount of each bonus as earned in the month it was received.

The Ninth Circuit found that logic dictated the bonuses should be averaged over the four-month period in which they were earned for purposes of calculating Neumiller’s “monthly” earnings, especially given other parts of the insurance policy explicitly stated that bonuses would be averaged over the period in which they were earned.

This ruling is unpublished, meaning it can’t be relied on as binding precedent, but still provides helpful clarity on the calculation of earnings under disability insurance policies.

Ninth Circuit Ruling Elevates Hidden Fine Print to Reduce ERISA Plan Benefit

If you were to poll the public on why lawyers or the legal system get a bad rap, the experience of getting surprised by something sneaky the other party buried in the fine print might rank high on the list. That was the outcome in Haddad v. SMG Long Term Disability Plan, decided February 10, 2023. There, the Ninth Circuit ruled that an ERISA plan could reduce a former employee’s benefit payments based on inconspicuous language hidden in the benefit plan documents.

Mr. Haddad, like many folks, had long-term disability coverage through his employer’s benefit plan. He became disabled and the plan paid him the benefits.

But the plan reduced his benefits. The insurance company administering the plan decided Mr. Haddad’s settlement with a third party amounted to “lost wages.” The terms of the benefit plan allowed disability benefits to be reduced if the disabled employee had been compensated for lost wages.

Mr. Haddad sued. He argued that the “lost wages” reduction was hidden in the benefit plan documents’ fine print. He pointed to earlier Ninth Circuit rulings that any limitations should be conspicuous and that employees shouldn’t “have to hunt for exclusions or limitations in the policy.”

The Ninth Circuit said this rule didn’t apply to Mr. Haddad. It ruled that reductions in benefit payments on the basis of an “offset” were different from reduced payments due to an “exclusion” or “limitation.” The opinion does not elaborate on whether the average non-lawyer would find the distinction meaningful.

The ruling is “unpublished”, meaning it shouldn’t be relied on as binding precedent for lower courts.

Ninth Circuit Considers When Death By Drunk Driving Is “Accidental”

Is death “accidental” when a person gets in a fatal car crash while over the legal alcohol limit? Courts have had a hard time answering this question. A recent Ninth Circuit ruling provides some clarity.

In Wolf v. Life Insurance Company of North America, the Ninth Circuit held that death resulting from drunk driving was “accidental” for purposes of insurance policy coverage.

In that case, the insured died after driving 65 miles per hour going the wrong way on a one-way road with a 10 mile per hour speed limit. An autopsy found he had a blood-alcohol level of 0.20%.

His family made an insurance claim with Life Insurance Company of North America (LINA). LINA had sold the deceased an insurance policy covering “accidental” death.

LINA denied the claim. It determined that death under these circumstances was not “accidental” because it was foreseeable that driving with a 0.20% blood-alcohol level would result in death or serious injury.

The family filed a lawsuit contesting the denial under ERISA. The Seattle federal court sided with the family. The court ruled that the decedent’s behavior was “extremely reckless” but did not make death so certain as to render it not “accidental”. LINA appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

The Ninth Circuit agreed with the lower court. It acknowledged that courts have applied different tests to determine whether death under these circumstances is “accidental.” It decided that the most appropriate question is whether death was “substantially certain” to occur: if death is substantially certain, it can’t be accidental.

Applying that test, the Ninth Circuit agreed that death was accidental. Although the insured’s behavior was reckless, it did not make death substantially certain. The court emphasized: “there is no doubt that drunk driving is ill-advised, dangerous, and easily avoidable.” But death was still accidental.

The court concluded with the truism that insurers who don’t want to cover death resulting from drunk driving should just add an explicit exclusion to their policies:

The solution for insurance companies like [LINA] is
simple: add an express exclusion in policies covering
accidental injuries for driving while under the influence of
alcohol, or for any other risky activity that the company
wishes to exclude….This would allow policyholders to form reasonable expectations about what type of coverage they are purchasing without having to make sense of conflicting bodies of caselaw that deal with obscure issues of contractual interpretation.

Don’t Assume All Employer-Adjacent Insurance is ERISA-governed, Says Ninth Circuit

There’s often an erroneous assumption that any insurance a person buys in connection with their employment is automatically subject to ERISA. But ERISA does not regulate all employer-adjacent insurance. ERISA only applies to employee benefit “plans.” Whether an ERISA “plan” exists can be complex, but without one, an insurance policy will not be subject to ERISA even if an employer was involved in its purchase.

A recent Ninth Circuit decision is a good reminder of this. In Steiglemann v. Symetra Life Ins. Co., the appellate court determined that an insurance policy purchased in connection with the plaintiff’s employment was not subject to ERISA because the requirements for an employee benefit “plan” were not met. The decision is unpublished, meaning it may be persuasive to lower courts but is not binding.

Jill Steiglemann bought a disability insurance policy from Symetra Life Insurance Company. She had access to the policy through her membership in a trade association for insurance agents. Her company paid for the insurance. The lower court held that the policy was part of an employee benefit plan and subject to ERISA.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower court and held that the policy was not governed by ERISA. Even though Steiglemann’s employer arranged for the option for her to buy coverage and paid premiums, this was not enough to show the employer established an ERISA plan.

The employer never contracted to provide for coverage. It never promised to act as an administrator for the insurance. And it never took the steps necessary to maintain an ERISA plan, like recordkeeping and filing returns with the Department of Labor.

Steiglemann’s trade association also did not do the things necessary to create an ERISA plan. The association did not function for the main purpose of representing employees against their employer.

There was therefore no evidence that Steiglemann’s insurance policy was part of an employee benefit plan. And without a plan, the policy was not subject to ERISA.

This decision is a helpful reminder not to assume that ERISA applies to all employer-adjacent insurance.